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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CASE NO. 8600 
CAL YIN GOULD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE & 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY, A Public Utility 
Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BR'IEF OF APPELLANT 
Richard W. Brann 
Attorney for Plaintiff & Appellant 
406 Kiesel Bldg., Ogden, Utah 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff-Appellant, hereinafter called Plaintiff, 
commenced this action for damages on December 30, 
1955, against Defendant-Appellee, hereinafter called De-
fendant, in the District Court for Weber County, Utah, 
Plaintiff alleging, among other things, that Defendant 
negligently omitted Plaintiff's name, business address and 
telephone number from the "Yellow Pages" of Defend-
ant's Ogden and Vicinity Telephone Directory. for 1956. 
The case was tried to a jury and the jury returned a ver-
dict in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant 
for the sum of $2,000.00 past and prospective profits lost 
by Plaintiff <T. 108). On October 5, 1956, the Honorable 
Parley E. Norseth, District Judge, made and entered an 
order setting the verdict of the jury aside and granting 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Plaintiff 
for nominal damages only <R. 39, 43) in accordance with 
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Defendant's motion for a directed verdict for Plaintiff 
for nominal damages <T. 82, 83). The Court would note 
that Plaintiff refers herein to the transcript of evidence 
as ( T.) and the balance of the record as ( R) . 
The facts in this case are simple and to a large ex-
tent undisputed except as to damages. The Plaintiff is 
a duly qualified and practicing attorney residing at and 
doing business in Ogden City, Utah <T. 46-47). The 
Defendant is a public utility telephone corporation doing 
business as such in the State of Utah <T. 16-17). On 
May 1, 1955, Plaintiff opened an office in the Kiesel 
Building, Ogden, Utah, and commenced the practice of 
law (T. 47). During August, 1955, Plaintiff contracted 
with Defendant for a "joint user" business telephone 
service <T. 24, 51) which was installed by Defendant in 
October, several weeks before issuance of the new tele-
phone directory <T. 24, 51 Plaintiff's Exhibits A & B). 
This contract for service included Plaintiff's entitlement 
to a listing in the "Yellow Pages" of the 1956 Ogden & 
Vicinity Telephone Directory under "Lawyers" of Plain-
tiff's name, business address and telephone number <T. 
24, 25, 38, 55, 57). The correct information concerning 
Plaintiff's name, business address and telephone number 
were correctly transmitted to the Defendant <T. 26, 30, 
57, 58) and the same were correctly set forth in the white 
pages of the 1956 Ogden Directory· <T. 30, Plaintiff's 
Exhibit F). Defendant admitted that it intended to prop-
erly list Plaintiff <T. 38) and Defendant gave no justifi-
able reason whatsoever for the omission <T. 39). 
Summarizing the foregoing relatively undisputed 
facts-which the jury necessarily found by its verdict-
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the Defendant negligently omitted Plaintiff's name, busi-
ness address and telephone number from the "Yellow 
Pages" of Defendant's Ogden Telephone Directory for 
1956 contrary to Defendant's contract obligation with 
Plaintiff. The facts relative to Plaintiff's damages re-
sulting from such omission are the major issue on this 
appeal. The facts in evidence relative to damages are not 
disputed, but both Defendant and the trial court ques-
tion their sufficiency to support the jury verdict for 
Plaintiff of $2,000.00. 
The Plaintiff's evidence of damages consisted of the 
testimony of himself, three brother lawyers and declara-
tions in the nature of admissions by Defendant: 
(a) Ira A. Huggins, Attorney, testified to his cus-
tom of cutting the section "Lawyers" from the Yello\v 
Pages of the Telephone Directory and of his invariable 
reference to such clipping for the purpose of contacting 
fellow lawyers <T. 6, 7 and 8). Mr. Huggins testified to 
difficulties in contacting Plaintiff and of his temporary 
assumption that Plaintiff was not practicing law in Ogden 
because of such omission <T. 6 and 7). 
(b) David S. Kunz, Attorney, whose testimony was 
excluded from evidence (T. 9-12). 
(c) Glen Adams, Attorney, testified that he also 
customarily referred to his "Lawyers" clipping from the 
Yell ow Pages ( T. 42) and that "several times," or more, 
he referred to such eli pping for the purpose of referring 
clients to Plaintiff, but because of the omission of Plain-
tiff's name, etc., from his clipping, Mr. Adams referred 
the clients in question to other lawyers. <T. 42 and 43). 
(d) The Plaintiff, Calvin Gould, testified to the 
decrease in his "new business' income following the is-
suance of the 1956 Telephone Directory <T. 62-80 inclu-
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sive) and stated that, in his opinion, he lost $200.00 a 
month gross fees by reason of non-listing in the "Yellow 
Pages" <T. 72). Defendant's objection to this opinion evi-
dence was not renewed nor stricken after its admission. 
(e) Defendant admits that it extensively advertises 
and encourages the public use of its Classified Directory 
or Yellow Pages <R. 7-13 inclusive, T. 18). 
(f) Defendant states, among other things, in its 
1956 Ogden & Vicinity Directory that: 
"Because it is so easy, 9 out of 10 people use the 
Yellow Pages when looking for thousands of other 
products or services. You can use it too, to learn who 
in your city, handles a certain product that has been 
recommended or which you have seen advertised 
elsewhere." <Page I, Yellow Pages, Exhibit F, T. 31). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point I. 
The trial court erred in setting aside the substantial 
damage verdict of the jury for Plaintiff and entering its 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in accordance with 
Defendant's motion, in favor of Plaintiff for nominal 
damages only, because the evidence in this cause was suf-
ficient to support the verdict of the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
It is settled law that where the case was tried to the 
jury and a verdict returned, this Court, in reviewing the 
grant of a judgment non obstante veredicto, must consider 
the evidence in the light most favorable to supporting the 
verdict and the Plaintiff is entitled to the most favorable 
view of conflicting-evidence. Seybold v. Union Pac. R. Co., 
121 Utah 61, 238 P. (2d) I 74; 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, 
Sec. 1574 (b); Bancroft's Code Practice & Remedies, 10 
year Supp., Sec. 1773. It is equally well settled that the 
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trial court does not have power to grant a motion for 
judgment n. o. v. unless it can say, as a matter of law, 
that there is neither evidence nor reasonable inference 
from evidence to sustain the verdict. 3 Bancroft's Code 
Practice & Remedies, Sec. 1 079 et seq. 
Defendant's contract with Plaintiff to furnish Plain-
tiff, for compensation, a business telephone service is un-
disputed <T. 22, 23, 24, 52, Plaintiff's Exhibits A, B, CJ. 
That said contract entitled Plaintiff to a listing under 
"Lawyers" in the Yellow Pages of the 1956 Ogden Direc-
tory is also undisputed, whether regarded as express <T. 
57, 58) or i~plied in contract <T. 24, 25, 38, 52) or im-
plied by law Sec. 54-3-8, U. C. A., 1953; 86 C.J.S., Tel & 
Tel., Sec. 265, 1956 Supp.; 52 Am. Jur., Tel. & Tel., Sec. 48, 
Supp., Sec. 95; Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Texas State 
Optical (Tex. Civ. App.) 253 S. W. (2d) 877. 
It is believed that Defendant will agree that it may be 
held liable for damages for the negligent omission of a 
business subscriber's listing from its Yellow Pages. 86 
C.J.S., Tel. & Tel., Sec. 265, 52 Am. Jur., Tel. & Tel., Sec. 
48, Supp., 95; 3 Sherman & Redfield, Neg., Sec. 567; Sec-
tions 54-2-1 <28), 54-3-1,54-3-8, 54-7-22, U. C. A., 1953; 
Annat. 68 A.L.R. 1325. 
There is no issue in this case regarding whether De-
fendant limited its liability by contract or otherwise, 
which Plaintiff concedes Defendant could do. See 175 
A.L.R. 8, 41, Sec. 25. The Defendant, on stipulation, 
struck its Third Defense of the complaint setting up a 
tariff limitation of liability. Defendant's Yellow Pages, at 
present, are not regulated by the Public Service Commis ... 
sian. 
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Anticipating Defendant's argument, raised in the 
course of the trial, that the Yellow Pages of the directory 
are not a public utility commodity, based on McTighe v. 
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 216 F. <2d) 26, Plain-
tiff respectfully refers the Court to the following cases 
that hold directly or by implication that the Yellow Pages 
are a public utility commodity that may be regulated by 
the appropriate State public service commission, namely: 
Calif. Fireproof & Storage Co. v. Brundige (Calif.) 248 
Pac. 669, 47 A.L.R. 811; Riaboff vs. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 
<Calif.) 102 P. <2d) 465; Dist. of Columbia v. Chesa-
peake & Pot. Tel Co., 179 F. (2d) 814; Russell v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 130 F. Supp. 130; Southwestern Bell 
Tel. Co., v. Texas State Optical (Tex.) 253 S. W. (2d) 
877 where the Court enjoined discrimination in the Yel-
low Pages; Sections 54-2-1 (28), 54-3-1, 54-3-8, 54-4-1, 
U. C. A. 1953; see State v. Nelson, 65 Utah 457, 238 P. 
237, where a business outside the scope of "public service" 
is defined. 
The point in issue on this appeal is whether or not 
the evidence of Plaintiff's damages in this case was suf-
ficient to go to the jury, or, in other words, whether the 
evidence was sufficient to raise a question of fact as to the 
extent of Plaintiff's damages. If there is no substantial 
competent evidence in this case upon which the jury could 
make a finding of Plqintiff's damages, then the Court 
could have directed a verdict and it did properly enter its 
judgement notwithstanding the verdict. Seybold v. Union 
Pac. R. Co., 121 Utah 61, 239 P. (2d) 174. But, as previ-
ously noted, all the evidence must be considered in a light 
most favorable to Plaintiff, Seybold v. Union Pac. R. Co., 
supra. If there is any substantial evidence in this case 
upon which men of ordinary reason and fairness could 
make a finding of Plaintiff's damages, then the trial court 
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had no power to enter its judgement notwithstanding the 
verdict and, on this appea1, this Court should reinstate 
the jury verdict. Seybold v. Union Pac. R. Co., supra; 5 
C.J.S., Appeal & Error, Sec. 1930; 9 Wigmore, 3ed., Sec. 
2994; Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure, 
Sec. 1079. 
,Plaintiff concedes that he must establish his mone-
tary loss by some reasonable degree of proof, but it is sub-
mitted that the degree of proof required in this case is sub-
stantially less than that required in, for instance, an auto-
mobile damage case. Examples of text authorities on this 
subject are as follows: 
" ... the Plaintiff will not be denied a substantial 
recovery if he has produced the best evidence avail-
able and it is sufficient to afford a reasonable basis 
for estimating his loss." 15 Am. Jur., Damages, Sec. 
23. 
"In many cases, although, substantial damages are 
established, their amount is, in so far as susceptible 
of pecuniary admeasurement, either entirely uncer-
tain or extremely difficult of ascertainment; in such 
cases Plain tiff is not denied all rights of recovery, and 
the amount is fixed by the Court or the jury in the 
exercise of sound discretion under proper instructions 
from the Court." 25 C.J .S. Damages, Section 28. 
Ironically, but without apology, this writer argued 
the converse side of this issue of certainty of proof as to 
damages in the case of Hill v. Varner,- Utah-, 290 
P. <2d) 448, wherein the trial court awarded the prevail-
ing party nominal damages and this Court reversed the 
trial Court, holding, among other things, that where the 
fact of substantial damage is proved, the Court must make 
an a\vard of substantial damages even though the extent 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of monetary loss is not proved with certainty. This Court 
said in the Hill case, supra.,· quoting at length, that: 
. "It is obvious that monetary loss because of injury 
to a chattel is capable of more certain proof than is 
the loss incurred because of a trespass to a water 
right or elements involved in bodily injury, Plaintiff 
should be held to that higher degree of proof. How-
ever, here we have an instance of substantial damage 
proved but only nominal damages awarded, where 
the general knowledge of the trier of the fact and all 
men must indicate a loss beyond the mere invasion of 
a legal right for which nominal damages are gener-
ally awarded. In all cases where damages are in dis-
pute, the injured party is oftimes inclined to exagger-
ate his claim and the tortfeasor to minimize it, the 
trier of the fact must resort to his own general knowl-
edge of values in order to conclude the litigation. IX 
Wigmore on Evidence, sec 2570. One of the the illus-
trations included in The Restatement of the Law of 
Torts, sec. 912, supra, indicates that the rule of cer-
tainty should not be applied contrary to the dictates 
of reason: 
Illustration I, p. 578. "A intentionally kills B's 
dog. No evidence is introduced as to the value 
of the dog. B is entitled only to nominal dam-
ages, unless the description of the dog by wit-
nesses is such as to indicate that it has some 
substantial value." 
"Although the amount of damages to be awarded 
is a question of fact appellant has shown that he is 
entitled to some compensatory damages." (Italics 
ours.) 
In the case at the bar, we are not dealing with a 
damaged chattel capable of repair and capable of itemiza-
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tion as to cost of repair. We are here dealing with a living 
economic organism, a business, that depends upon clients 
for its continued existence. A lawyer cannot advertise, but 
he can ethically be listed in certain publications which in-
cludes that of being listed in the Yellow Pages of the Tele-
phone Directory together with his brother lawyers in the 
area and without discrimination. A lawyer sells a service 
and not a commodity such as a retail store might sell. A 
lawyer's return from each client varies, depending on the 
nature of the case, the nature of his contract with the 
client, results obtained and a diversity of other factors. A 
lawyer's expenses are pretty much a constant during any 
one period and, therefore, the addition to or loss of income 
is almost wholly profit, whether going to diminish over-
head, or increase net profit. The addition of one satisfied 
client may well, over a professional lifetime, multiply itself 
many times over by referred satisfied clients. The gain or 
loss of one contingent fee can very well make the differ-
ence to a young lawyer of continued practice or insurance 
adjusting. 
The Defendant admits that it extensively advertises 
the use and benefits derived from the use of its Yellow 
Pages (R. 7-13 inclusive, T. 18, p. I, Yellow Pages, Plain-
tiff's Exhibit F). Each of Plaintiff's attorney witnesses 
testified that he customarily cut the appropriate "Law-
yers" section from the periodic Yellow Pages and posted 
such clipping for reference. Defendant claims the "9 out 
of 10 people use the Yellow Pages when looking for thous-
ands of other products or services" (P. I, Yellow Pages, 
Exhibit f). The substantial monthly charges for advertis-
ing space in the Yellow Pages are well known. 
In most, if not all, communities, the only complete 
listing of lawyers offered to the general public is that of 
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the Yellow Pages. Plaintiff's lawyer witnesses, Ira Huggins 
and Glen Adams, both testified to their custom of cutting 
the classified lawyer section from their directories and 
posting them for reference (T. 6, 7, 8, 42) and both furth-
er testified to their assumption that Plaintiff was not 
available when they found him completely omitted· from 
their lists ( T. 7, 42) . Both witnesses were personally ac-
quainted with Plaintiff and brothers in the same compara-
tively small bar association, yet each assumed Plaintiff to 
be unavailable. Ira Huggins also testified to the fact that 
persons, other than lawyers, refer to the classified section 
on lawyers <T. 8). The foregoing testimony certainly and 
eloquently established the fact that Plaintiff was damaged 
by the complete omission of his name, business address 
and telephone number from the 1956 Ogden Classified 
Directory. 
A lawyer's clients come to him in many ways-estab-
lished clients, express referrals, referrals by way of publi-
city and reputation, and chance clients-but there must 
be an initial contact before the relationship is established 
or problem posed. This writer respectfully submits that it 
is a matter of common knowledge that the vast majority of 
initial contacts are established by telephone and that such 
initial contacts are instituted by the potential client over 
the telephone. It is further submitted that the primary 
source of information leading to such initial contacts is 
found in the Yellow Pages of the local telephone direc-
tories. 
Every client lost by Plaintiff by reason of his omission 
from the Yellow Pages represented the loss of a legal fee 
-be it great or little, a fee. Plaintiff testified to the de-
crease in his "new business" income following the issu-
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ance of the 1956 telephone directory and stated that, in 
his opinion, he lost $200.00 a month gross fees by reason 
of said omission (T. 62-80 inclusive). 
That the Plaintiff lost "several" or more clients by 
reason of his omission from the Yellow Pages is uncontra-
dicted. Glen Adams, Esq., testified that several times-
" if I were to guess I tried three times"-he attempted to 
refer clients to Plaintiff, but that he referred said clients 
to other attorneys because of such omission of Plaintiff 
from the Yellow Pages <T. 42, 43). The loss of any one 
of these clients could well involve the loss of thousands of 
dollars over the life of Plaintiff's legal career aD:d, as afore-
said, the loss at least involved a fee constituting substan-
tial damages. 
In closing, this writer cannot help but be disturbed 
by the position of Defendant. Defendant, in substance, 
tells the public and this Court that it can do as it pleases 
in performance of its multi-million dollar monopoly en-
deavor, namely, production and sale of its Yellow Pages, 
and that subscribers to space and listings in· the Yellow 
Pages are helpless to hold Defendant to the ordinary 
rules of liability for non-performance because of impos-
sibility of proving damages. To say the Defendant cannot 
discriminate and then to allow recovery of damages only 
upon proof certain--otherwise relegating claimant to 
nominal damages-is tantamount to opening the door 
wide to discrimination in this type of case. Cognizant of 
cases such as this at the bar, Restatement makes the fol-
lowing comment: 
"Furthermore, , there are cases in which the ex-
perience of mankind is convincing that a substantial 
pecuniary loss has occurred, while at the same time 
II 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
it is of such a character that the amount in money is 
incapable of proof. In these cases, the Defendant 
usually has reason to foresee this difficulty of proof 
and should not be allowed to profit by it. In such 
cases, it is reasonable to require a lesser degree of 
certainty as to the amount of loss, leaving a greater 
degree of discretion to the jury, subject to the usual 
supervisory power of the Court." Restatement of the 
Law, Contracts, Sec. 331. 
CONCLUSION 
There was sufficient, substantial, competent evidence 
to support the verdict of the jury in the case at the bar 
and, therefore, the verdict of the jury should be reinstated 
in its entirety. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD W. BRANN 
Attorney for Plaintiff & Appellant 
12 
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